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EXPENSE PREFERENCE BEHAVIOR BY MANAGERS IN CASINO RESORTS
Toni Repetti, Michael C. Dalbor, Ashok K. Singh, and Bo J. Bernhard
William F. Harrah College of Hotel Administration, University of Nevada-Las Vegas, Las Vegas, NV
ABSTRACT. The main goal of management in the United States is to maximize the wealth of
shareholders. Managers, though, sometimes make decisions that benefit them more than the
shareholders. When this occurs they are considered to be exhibiting expense preference
behavior. This study evaluates expense preference behavior by managers of Nevada casinos.
Using ordinary least squares regression, significant positive results show that for each 1%
increase in revenue, employees increase 0.88%, salaries and wages increase 0.98%, and total
payroll increases 1.01%. Also during the biggest economic downturn to hit Nevada casinos,
management significantly decreased employees 14.7%, salaries and wages 4.9%, and total
payroll 3.9%. Since managers are able to decrease payroll-related expenses after controlling
for the change in business volumes, they are most likely operating inefficiently during good
economic times. These additional expenses equate to a lower net income, which decreases
owners’ residual income and increases the need to borrow during growth periods.
INTRODUCTION
The main goal of many firmmanagers in the
United States is to maximize the wealth of their
shareholders. Casino firms are no exception.
Some of the largest gaming companies in
Nevada have company mission statements or
goals in which shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion is their main concern. MGM Resorts
International (2014) and Boyd Gaming Corpor-
ation (2014) both have mission statements that
mention increasing shareholder wealth as a
goal. Many Nevada gaming companies also
state that shareholder wealth maximization is a
goal of the firm in their annual reports and on
their websites.
Over the last five decades, some research-
ers have questioned whether managers are
actually trying to increase the wealth of
shareholders or whether they are more
concerned with increasing their own utility.
This concern led to the study of expense
preference behavior by managers. Expense
preference behavior occurs when managers
attempt to increase their own well-being with
additional pay or perquisites such as increased
staff, luxurious offices, travel, or entertainment
(Williamson, 1963). In addition to the empirical
research on expense preference behavior, there
are many recent business examples of
managers of publicly traded companies acting
in ways to increase their benefits at the expense
of shareholders.
Recently, during the 2007–2009 govern-
ment bailout of banks andmortgage companies,
CEOs were accused of acting in unscrupulous
ways. American International Group (AIG)
received $85 billion in a government bailout
and less than a week after receiving the bailout,
top executives went on a week-long retreat,
spending over $440,000 on rooms, meals, and
spa treatments (Ross & Shine, 2008). After the
bailout, the CEO still received a bonus of $15
million (Ross & Shine, 2008). AIG was not the
only company under scrutiny. Bank of America
was also criticized for paying $15 billion for
Merrill Lynch bonuses for 2008, a year in which
the company had an annual loss of $11 billion
(Blodget, 2009). These bonuses were paid after
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Bank of America received $25 billion in
government assistance in 2007 and $20 billion
in cash and a $100 billion guarantee for loss of
assets in January 2009 (Rucker & Stempel,
2009). These recent business examples show
that executives do not always maximize the
value of the firm and instead maximize their
own utility, which supports expense preference
behavior by managers.
Research shows that managers who exhibit
expense preference behavior most likely spend
more in payroll-related expenses (Carter &
Stover, 1991; Edwards, 1977; Lewin, Derzon,
& Margulies, 1981; Williamson, 1963).
In Nevada casinos, payroll and benefits are
the largest expense items, averaging 32.5% of
gross revenue in 2013 (Nevada State Gaming
Control Board, 2013). In casino jurisdictions
outside of Nevada, payroll expenses are the first
or second largest operating expenses behind
only gaming taxes (American Gaming Associ-
ation, 2013).
Payroll expenses are very controllable in the
hospitality industry. They are typically adjusted
with changes in business volumes. Casinos
almost immediately laid off more than 10,000
employees after September 11, 2001, in
response to the lower number of visitors
(Benston, 2008b). Casino management rea-
lized this may have been an overreaction so
during the 2007–2009 recession management
laid off workers but at a slower pace. During
2007–2009, MGM Resorts International laid
off 1,400 employees and Caesars Entertain-
ment laid off 2,000 employees (Benston,
2008a, 2008b). Even after the state’s gaming
industry started to see year-over-year revenue
increases, management was still decreasing
payroll-related expenses (Nevada State Gaming
Control Board, 2013). Figure 1 shows the trend
in revenue and payroll expenses from 1990 to
2013. As shown in Figure 1, revenue in Nevada
casinos has not yet rebounded to pre-recession
levels seen in 2007.
The purpose of this study is to evaluate
Nevada casino resort managers and to assess
whether theymaybemaximizing their ownutility
over wealth maximization for shareholders.
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FIGURE 1. Revenue, employees, salaries and wages, and total payroll in Nevada casinos.
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Specifically this study evaluates management’s
behavior in regard to payroll-related expenses.
It is essential for casino owners to know whether
their managers are striving to achieve personal
wealth maximization. Every dollar that managers
spend to maximize their own utility is one dollar
fewer that the owners receive. While some may
accept this when firms are making money, it is
questionable when firms have declining reven-
ues and profit margins. This study will also add to
the current research on expense preference
behavior. In particular, it will increase the amount
of research on expense preference behavior
by managers in hospitality organizations. This
will be the fourth known study on expense
preference behavior in hospitality and the only
one concerned with casino firms overall.
In addition, this will be the only known expense
preference study that will evaluate manage-
ment’s reaction to a long-term economic down-
turn in regard to payroll-related expenses.
LITERATURE REVIEW
When an owner hires a manager or a
management team to work for them they are
establishing an agency relationship (Chatfield
& Dalbor, 2005). With any agency relationship,
there may be potential problems because of the
conflicting interests between the owners and
managers. While the goal of a firm’s managers
should be to increase the value of the firm for all
shareholders, this may not always be achieved.
Managers and owners each have different
interests, and these interests typically involve
maximizing their own wealth and not the
wealth of the other party. When this conflict
happens, agency problems arise. These agency
problems can be monitored and controlled
with effective contracts and monitoring, but at
an increased cost. Minimizing agency problems
and agency costs can effectively lead managers
to maximize the value of the firm for the
owners. Potential agency problems include
information asymmetry, adverse selection, and
moral hazard. Moral hazard on the part of
managers within a casino is the concern of this
study and occurs when one party takes a certain
action and hides it from the other.
The agency problem of moral hazard can
occur in many ways. One way is by expense
preference behavior by managers. Expense
preference behavior occurs when managers do
not maximize the value of the firm but instead
maximize their own personal utility (Wil-
liamson, 1963). This can involve management’s
potential desire for increased staff, expendi-
tures for perquisites, and use of discretionary
funds to the detriment of shareholders.
Previous studies find that expense preference
behavior by managers occurs more commonly
in industries that are highly regulated (Mixon
& Upadhyaya, 1996, 1999; Williamson, 1963).
The gaming industry is considered one of the
more highly regulated industries for various
reasons including high barriers to entry due to
licensing requirements and multiple regulatory
agencies for consumer protection. Expense
preference behavior has specifically been
shown to exist in highly regulated industries
under the following conditions: lack of
competition and separation of ownership and
control.
Competition
Mixon and Upadhyaya (1996, 1999) show
that more regulations lead to higher expense
preference behavior, while Gropper and
Oswald (1996) and Gropper and Hudson
(2003) analyze the opposite effect and find
that after deregulation, expenses significantly
decrease. Generally with deregulation comes
additional competition, and many studies
evaluate level of competition instead of
regulation as an indicator of expense pre-
ference behavior.
Previous studies evaluate competition in
numerous ways including monopolistic firms
versus non-monopolies and market concen-
tration. A high market concentration indicates
less competition, while a low market concen-
tration indicates a higher level of competition.
In the seminal work on expense preference
behavior theory, Williamson (1963) finds that
market concentration is significant and posi-
tively related to executive compensation.
Edwards (1977), Hannan (1979), and Arnould
(1985) also find that managers in less
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competitive markets exhibit expense prefer-
ence behavior over those in more competitive
markets. In these studies, as competition
increases so does profitability because man-
agers reduce costs to respond to the pressure of
increased competition.
Carter, Massa, and Power (1997) and
Rhoades (1980) show that market concen-
tration is significant but negatively related to
expenses. Carter et al. (1997) only find this
significance in administrative expenses, not in
payroll-related expenses, where they find no
significance. These results shows that expenses
are lower in high-concentration markets or
there is no significant relationship, both of
which reject expense preference behavior.
Carter et al. (1997) and Hannan and Mavinga
(1980) find that when taking into account the
interaction between market concentration and
management control, market concentration by
itself is not significant.
Ownership Structure
With the conflicting results concerning
market concentration, prior researchers evalu-
ate other variables in addition to and in
interaction with market concentration. The
next most common variable studied is related to
firm ownership structure. Many researchers
believe that ownership structure can be an
indicator of the level of separation between
owners and managers, with differing owner-
ships structures lending to more or less of a
separation. Verbrugge and Goldstein (1981),
Verbrugge and Jahera (1981), and Akella and
Greenbaum (1988) find that management in
mutual savings and loans (S&Ls) exhibit expense
preference behavior over those in stock S&Ls.
Themost likely reason is that there is less control
and monitoring by owners in mutual S&Ls.
Another ownership structure evaluated was
not-for-profit firms versus proprietary firms.
Researchers believe that not-for-profit man-
agers will spend more because not-for-profit
firms cannot make money for their owners,
although the results are mixed. Oswald,
Gardiner, and Jahera (1994) and Carter et al.
(1997) show that managers under a not-for-
profit structure spend more than those under a
proprietary structure, while Lewin et al. (1981)
find different results depending on what
expenses they evaluate.
Becker and Sloan (1985) believe it is
important to control for other firm differences
besides just ownership structure. Once con-
trolling for factors other than ownership, the
authors find that ownership structure does not
affect expenses. Fields (1988) and Blair and
Placone (1988) find that ownership structure is
also not significant once they include firm size
as a factor. Kim, Dalbor, and Feinstein (2007)
evaluate management type (owner-managed or
outsider-managed) as an indicator of ownership
structure and also interaction with ownership
percentage. Results show that management
type by itself is not significant, although
ownership percentage does show a significant
positive relationship on cost of doing business.
Results show that the cost of business is
lowest for owner-managed firms with the
manager owning 100%. Since the managers
are also the owners, there is no separation of
ownership. Also, as the percentage of primary
ownership decreases, the mean size of staff
significantly increases.
Firm Size
Another indicator of separation of owner-
ship and control for companies is firm size, with
an increase in firm size generally contributing
to a further separation. Numerous studies find
that firm size is a contributing factor to
expense preference behavior by managers.
Fields (1988), Gropper and Oswald (1996),
Mixon and Upadhyaya (1996), and Carter et al.
(1997) show that as firm size increases,
expenses significantly increase. Blair and
Placone (1988) and Smirlock and Marshall
(1983) find that once firm size is taken into
account, market concentration is no longer
significant, indicating that firm size is the true
variable affecting management behavior. Smir-
lock and Marshall (1983) and Williamson
(1973) believe that the organizational complex-
ity of a firm increases with its size, resulting in
more layers and diffused ownership. As the
number of layers increases, the amount of
expense preference behavior throughout the
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organization will increase. When evaluating the
hotel division within Nevada casinos, Repetti
and Dalbor (2014) also find that firm size is a
factor. This study evaluates number of occupied
rooms as a variable for firm size and finds that as
the number of occupied rooms increases by
1%, hotel managers employ 0.91% more
employees, which causes total payroll to
increase 1.05%.
Although results are mixed, the majority of
studies find support for utility maximization by
managers over shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion. Various dependent variables are evaluated
with payroll-related variables as the most
common. The independent variables used in
determining expense preference behavior are
size, competition, and ownership structure.
As firms increase in size so do expenses, which
may be an indication of expense preference
behavior. Competition results are the most
mixed, but most studies find that once other
variables are accounted for, competition is no
longer significant. Moreover, firms that have a
larger diffusion of ownership have a tendency
to have higher expenses, which may be an
indicator of expense preference behavior by
managers.
Hypotheses
Based on previous research, three hypoth-
eses are proposed as indicators of expense
preference behavior by managers. The first
hypothesis evaluates total revenue, which is
used as a proxy for firm size, with larger firms
spending more in expenses due to the greater
separation of ownership (Blair & Placone,
1988; Carter et al., 1997; Gropper & Oswald,
1996; Mixon & Upadhyaya, 1996; Smirlock &
Marshall, 1983). The second hypothesis
analyzes whether higher market share leads to
expense preference behavior (Arnould, 1985;
Edwards, 1977; Hannan, 1979; Williamson,
1963). Hypothesis three is concerned with
periods of economic downturn and is a new
variable in expense preference behavior
research. During an economic downturn and
after controlling for the effect of the change in
business volumes, managers should not need to
make any additional payroll adjustments since
efficient managers should have already accom-
plished this due to the change in business
volumes. If managers are exhibiting expense
preference behavior, they may further decrease
payroll expenses since they may have been
overstaffed during the period prior to the
economic downturn. The alternative hypoth-
eses are stated below. The “a” hypotheses are
for model 1, with a dependent variable of
number of employees. The “b” hypotheses are
for model 2, with a dependent variable of
salaries and wages. The “c” hypotheses are for
model 3, with a dependent variable of total
payroll.
H1a: Number of employees will increase as
casino size increases.
H1b: Salaries and wages will increase as
casino size increases.
H1c: Total payroll will increase as casino size
increases.
H2a: Number of employees will increase as
market share increases.
H2b: Salaries and wages will increase as
market share increases.
H2c: Total payroll will increase as market
share increases.
H3a: Number of employees will decrease
during a period of economic downturn.
H3b: Salaries and wages will decrease during
a period of economic downturn.
H3c: Total payroll will decrease during a
period of economic downturn.
METHODOLOGY
Data Collection
Annual data for 24 fiscal years ending June
30 of each year for 1990 to 2013 were
obtained from the Nevada State Gaming
Control Board’s Nevada Gaming Abstract.
These years were selected for two reasons: (1)
They were the only years publicly available at
the time of writing this paper and (2) Nevada
had a significant change in the gaming land-
scape in the late 1980s with the addition of the
first mega resort so starting with 1990 allowed
the study to concentrate on the landscape that
currently exists in the state. Each Nevada casino
128 T. REPETTI ET AL.
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with a nonrestricted gaming license and annual
gaming revenue of $1 million or more is
included in this report. A nonrestricted gaming
license is issued by the state for casinos with at
least 15 slot machines or that have any other
casino game including a race book or sports
book. The data are aggregated into groupings
using geographical region and size. Each
aggregate group of data was modified to be
the average for each casino in that grouping. All
dollars have been converted to 2013 constant
dollars.
Model
The gaming industry in Nevada is a good
industry in which to test expense preference
behavior by managers. Based on the previous
literature, high regulation and a large separation
of ownership have been found to be indicators
for expense preference behavior. The gaming
industry in Nevada has very high barriers to
entry due to the regulatory environment and
high fixed-asset costs at start up. Also, during
fiscal year 2013, 76.6% of gross gaming
revenue in Nevada was produced by 66
publicly owned casinos (Nevada State Gaming
Control Board, 2013). Being publicly owned,
these casinos have a high separation of
ownership.
Once these two variables are addressed, the
other variables can be analyzed using multiple
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, which is
the most common way previous research has
been conducted on expense preference
behavior. Also following all prior research,
separatemodelswere evaluated for the different
expenses. In addition, hospitality firms, includ-
ing casinos, have a large percentage of part-time
and on-call employees (Worland & Wilson,
1988), so the number of employees and payroll
expense models need to be evaluated separ-
ately so the effects on each can be individually
analyzed. The three dependent variables (Y) are
natural log of number of employees (model 1),
natural log of total salaries and wages (model 2),
and natural log of total payroll (model 3). Total
payroll includes total salaries and wages, payroll
taxes, and employee benefits. The data were
transformed with a natural log to achieve
normality and homoscedasticity.
The full model analyzed was:
Yi ¼ b0 þ b1Revþ b2Compþ b3Downþ 1i
Where
Y ¼ Natural log of dependent variable
b ¼ Coefficients for each predictor variable
Rev ¼ Natural log of total revenue
Comp ¼ Dummy variable coded as “1” for
market share of 63% or higher and “0”
otherwise
Down ¼ Dummy variable coded as “1” for
the economic downturn and “0” otherwise
1 ¼ Error term
Market share was calculated as the percentage
of revenue each aggregate group of casinos is
accountable for in each market. A dummy
variable of “1” indicates lower competition.
A market share of 63% was used since this was
the most common level used in previous
research (Arnould, 1985; Hannan, 1979;
Hannan & Mavinga, 1980). A market share of
76% was also tested since some previous
research used that percentage and there were
no significant differences in the results.
The dummy variable for an economic
downturn was “1” for the long-term economic
downturn that started in fiscal year ending June
30, 2008, and continued through 2013. These
dates were used instead of the National Bureau
of Economic Research’s recession dates since
Nevada casinos have not yet fully rebounded to
pre-recession levels and had another year of
decreases in revenue from 2012 to 2013.
Nevada casinos also had a decrease in revenue
in fiscal year ending June 30, 2002, as
compared to the prior year but rebounded
back to the 2001 level within the next year.
An alpha level of .05 was used for statistical
significance for all variables.
Potential multicollinearity among predictors
was evaluated by analyzing variance inflation
factors (VIF) for each of the three models. There
were no VIFs greater than 1.1 and since a VIF
above 10 is typically considered an indicator
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of multicollinearity, none of the models had
multicollinearity issues (Kutner, Nachtsheim,
Neter, & Li, 2005). The VIFs were the same for
all three models. Also after transforming the
data, there were a few outliers in model 1 only,
but the results did not significantly change by
deleting these outliers so they were left in the
data set so capture all actual results.
RESULTS
Descriptive Summary
Descriptive statistics of all variables are
shown in Table 1 and are in 2013 constant
dollars. Figure 2 shows the trend of these means
from 1990 to 2013. The number of employees
had a mean value of 786 with a standard
deviation of 895. The average number of
employees fluctuated around 800 for the
earlier years analyzed but since hitting a high
point in 2000 has continually decreased
besides a small increase prior to the recession.
As of 2013, the mean number of employees
was at the lowest level of all years, at 646
employees. Revenue had a mean of $85.7
million and a standard deviation of $126.3
million. Mean annual revenue steadily
increased until fiscal year 2000 at which time
it took a decline for three years before starting
to increase again. This increase occurred until
the start of the recession and mean annual
revenue has remained relatively flat since then.
Mean revenue in 2013 was just above the
mean for the entire period. Salaries and wages
had a mean value of $21.5 million and a
standard deviation of $29.5 million. Total
payroll had a mean value of $29.3 million and
a standard deviation of $41.6 million. Both
salaries and wages and total payroll followed
similar trends over time. Both these expenses
also followed the same trend as number of
TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics
N Min Max Mean Std. Dev.
Employees 400 52.00 4,308.00 785.67 894.61
Revenue* 400 4.88 711.78 85.73 126.30
Salaries and Wages* 400 1.13 152.32 21.48 29.46
Total Payroll* 400 1.34 212.29 29.34 41.61
Note. *in millions at 2013 constant dollars.
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FIGURE 2. Mean revenue, employees, salaries and wages, and total payroll in Nevada casinos.
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employees. In addition, both salaries and wages
and total payroll in 2013 were approximately
the same as the mean for the entire period. This
is a different trend then the number of
employees, which showed a 18% decrease in
2013 employees as compared to the mean.
The Pearson correlation between number
of employees and revenue was .98. The
Pearson correlation between “salaries and
wages” and revenue was .99. The Pearson
correlation between total payroll and revenue
was also .99. All correlations were significant
at the .01 level. Since Pearson correlation
between a continuous variable and a nominal
variable are typically not meaningful, these
correlations are not discussed.
Overall Model Results
A high 97.0% of the variance in the natural
log of employees was accounted for by the
natural log of revenue, the market share
variable, and the economic downturn variable.
This model was significant in explaining the
variance, F (3,396) ¼ 4,344.82, p , .0005.
Table 2 presents the regression results of
model 1.
For model 2, 98.2% of the variance in the
natural log of salaries and wages was accounted
for by the natural log of revenue, the market
share variable, and the dummy variable for the
economic downturn. Results of the ANOVA
show that this model was significant in
explaining the variance, F (3,396) ¼ 7,203.02,
p , .0005. Table 3 presents the regression
results of model 2 in which the dependent
variable was the natural log of salaries and
wages.
Model 3 shows that 98.8% of the variance in
the natural log of total payroll was accounted for
by the natural log of revenue, the market share
dummy variable, and the economic downturn
variable. This model was significant in explain-
ing the variance, F (3,396) ¼ 10,702.52,
p , .0005. The regression results of model 3 in
which the dependent variable was the natural
log of total payroll are shown in Table 4.
Hypothesis 1: Firm Size
Results of all three models support
hypothesis 1, that as revenue increased, all
dependent variables also increased. Table 2
indicates that for each 1% increase in revenue,
the number of employees increased 0.88%.
TABLE 2. Regression Coefficients for Model 1
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
(Constant) 29.126 .137 266.389 .000*
Ln(Revenue) 0.876 .008 0.993 109.826 .000*
Market Share Dummy 20.119 .020 20.053 25.859 1.000
Economic Downturn Dummy 20.147 .021 20.062 27.104 .000*
Note. Dependent variable is Ln(Employees).
* p , .0005.
TABLE 3. Regression Coefficients for Model 2
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
(Constant) 20.934 .119 27.847 .000**
Ln(Revenue) 0.984 .007 1.006 142.496 .000**
Market Share Dummy 20.162 .018 20.065 29.255 1.000
Economic Downturn Dummy 20.049 .018 20.019 22.747 .006*
Note. Dependent variable is Ln(Salaries and Wages).
*p , .05; **p , .0005.
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Based on Table 3, for each 1% increase in
revenue, total salaries and wages increased
0.98%. Table 4 shows that for each 1% increase
in revenue, total payroll increased 1.01%.
Hypothesis 2: Market Share
The market share dummy variable was not
significant in any of the models for a one-tailed
test since the coefficient was negative, which
indicated that hypothesis 2 was not supported.
The corresponding null is one-sided, hence the
p value ¼ 1.000 in each case. Please note that
any software computes p values for two-sided
alternatives and since the corresponding
t-values were negative and opposite of the
alternative, these are not significant.
Hypothesis 3: Economic Downturn
The economic downturn dummy variable
was also significant in all models, which
supported hypothesis 3 and implied that during
a sustained economic downturn, casino firms
decreased the number of employees, salaries
and wages, and total payroll after controlling for
firm size. During the 2008–2013 economic
downturn, Nevada casino firms decreased the
number of employees 14.7% as shown in Table
2. Table 3 shows that casino firms also
decreased salary and wage expenses 4.9%.
In addition, during this economic downturn,
casino firms decreased total payroll expenses
3.9%, as shown in Table 4. These decreases
were after taking into account the decrease in
employees and expenses that occurred due to
the change in revenue from lower business
volumes.
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
As casino firms increased in size and
produced more revenue, they had more pay-
roll-related expenses, which supports not only
prior researchbut also hypotheses 1a, 1b, and1c
(Blair & Placone, 1988; Carter et al., 1997;
Gropper&Oswald, 1996;Mixon&Upadhyaya,
1996; Repetti & Dalbor, 2014; Smirlock &
Marshall, 1983). For each 1% increase in
revenue, casinos hired 0.88% more employees,
spent 0.98% more in salaries and wages, and
incurred 1.01% more in total payroll. Based on
the mean revenue for Nevada casino firms from
Table 1, a 1% increase in revenue equated to
$857,300. As Nevada casinos generated this
additional revenue, they hired 6.9 more
employees, spent $210,500 more in salaries
and wages, and $296,300 in total payroll. Each
additional employee generated $124,200 in
annual revenue and cost the company $30,500
in salaries and wages and $42,900 in total
payroll. When analyzing the entire sample
period, each employee generated only
$109,100 in revenue and cost the firms
$27,300 in salaries and wages and $37,300 in
total payroll. The additional employees pro-
duced more revenue than average over the 24-
year period analyzed. The most likely reason is
that as casinos generate additional revenue the
increase in staff is variable positions and no
additional fixed positions need to be added.
The thought that higher revenue may lead
to more expense preference behavior by
managers is because the larger the firm, the
more separation and layers between owners
and managers (Smirlock & Marshall, 1983).
Another reason, and probably a more valid
TABLE 4. Regression Coefficients for Model 3
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
(Constant) 21.192 .101 211.839 .000**
Ln(Revenue) 1.013 .006 1.008 173.478 .000**
Market Share Dummy 20.149 .015 20.058 210.026 1.000
Economic Downturn Dummy 20.039 .015 20.014 22.571 .011*
Note. Dependent variable is Ln(Total Payroll).
*p , .05; **p , .0005.
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reason in casinos, could be that as firms
increase in size and generate more revenue,
they require more employees to produce that
revenue. Managers may not be exhibiting
expense preference behavior in that case. This
predictor variable was still significant to control
for revenue changes when evaluating the other
variables.
The market share dummy variable was not
significant in any of the three models and does
not support any of hypotheses two. This finding
did support what Smirlock and Marshall (1983)
found, that when firm size is taken into account
market concentration is not significant. These
results also support what Repetti and Dalbor
(2014) found when evaluating the hotel
division within casinos. These findings, though,
were opposite of what many previous expense
preference studies reported, although not all of
these previous studies included firm size in
their analysis (Arnould, 1985; Carter et al.,
1997; Edwards, 1977; Hannan, 1979; Hannan
& Mavinga, 1980; Williamson 1963). Market
share may not have been significant due to the
fact that are more than 260 casinos in Nevada
making over $1 million a year in gross gaming
revenue and just because one casino has a large
market share within a region there are many
other casinos that are in a region close by.
In addition, the high number of casinos in
general may be causing the casinos to be more
efficient in staffing levels since they have more
standards and benchmarks to compare and
adhere themselves to.
As shown in Table 5, during the largest
economic downturn to hit Nevada casinos,
management decreased the number of
employees and payroll-related expenses,
which supports hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c.
These decreases occurred even after controlling
for the decreases due to lower business
volumes. Casinos decreased the number of
employees 14.7% during this period. They also
decreased salaries and wages 4.9% and total
payroll 3.9%. These decreases equated to 115
employees, $1.05 million in salaries and wages,
and $1.14 million in total payroll.
The decrease in salaries and wages equates
to $9,100 per employee who was cut. While
this amount may appear small, many jobs
within the hospitality industry are hourly and
part-time (Worland & Wilson, 1988). The large
decrease in employees as compared to salaries
and wages may be an indication that more part-
time and on-call positions were cut during this
time. For part-time and on-call employees,
there can be little or no payroll related to these
employees but they are considered an
employee in this data set. This is most likely
the reason for the large difference in the
decrease in employees and the decrease in
payroll expenses. While both went down,
number of employees decreased almost three
times that of salaries and wages. These results
are not consistent with what Repetti and Dalbor
(2014) found when evaluating just the rooms
division within casino hotels. That study found
that the 2007–2009 recession did not have a
significant impact on payroll-related expenses,
but that study only evaluated the hotel division
which accounts for approximately 18% of total
employees in Nevada casino resorts (Nevada
State Gaming Control Board, 2013) and only
evaluated the period immediately correspond-
ing to the national recession. This study
evaluated the entire resort including gaming,
food, and beverage departments, which are
generally much more labor-intensive than the
hotel department, and it evaluated a longer
time period of economic downturn to take into
account long-term changes in staffing.
If casino managers were able to decrease
payroll-related expenses during the economic
downturn beyond the level necessary for the
lower business volumes, they may have
operated inefficiently during non-downturn
periods. If managers were operating efficiently
during these periods, they would have been
able to accomplish the decrease in employees
TABLE 5. Effects of the 2008–2013 Economic Downturn on
Dependent Variables
Dependent Variable Mean % Change $ Change
Number of Employees 785.7 214.7% 2115.50
Salaries and Wages* $21.5 24.9% 2$1.05
Total Payroll* $29.3 23.9% 2$1.14
Note. *in millions at 2013 constant dollars.
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and payroll expenses by just adjusting for the
decrease in business volumes. This may be an
indication that managers were exhibiting
expense preference behavior during non-
downturn periods. It is also possible that
managers overcompensated during the 2008–
2013 downturn like they did after September
11, 2001, but the period studied was six years
long so this is likely not the cause of the
significant difference since management could
not be understaffed for that long.
CONCLUSION
Nevada casinos are highly regulated and
the data collected for this study include larger
firms, of which 76.6% are publicly owned.
There is strong support from previous research
that being highly regulated can give managers
more opportunity to exhibit expense prefer-
ence behavior (Gropper & Hudson, 2003;
Gropper & Oswald, 1996; Mixon & Upad-
hyaya, 1996; Williamson, 1963). The fact that
over three-fourths of the casinos are publicly
owned shows that these firms have a high
possibility of a greater separation of ownership,
which is also supported by previous research to
give managers a chance to exhibit expense
preference behavior (Akella & Greenbaum,
1988; Oswald et al., 1994; Verbrugge &
Goldstein, 1981; Verbrugge & Jahera, 1981).
With these two characteristics standard for all
firms tested, Nevada casinos could be evaluated
with other variables. Firm size was found to have
a significant positive relationship to payroll-
related expenses, which supports previous
research (Blair & Placone, 1988; Carter et al.,
1997; Fields, 1988; Gropper & Oswald, 1996;
Mixon & Upadhyaya, 1996; Repetti & Dalbor,
2014; Smirlock & Marshall, 1983; Williamson,
1973). As Nevada casinos increased revenue by
1%, they also spent between 0.98% and 1.01%
more in payroll-related expenses. While pre-
vious research has stated that the increase in
payroll is an indication of expense preference
behavior, it may also just be a control variable to
accurately interpret the effect of other variables.
This study is the first known study in which
a long-term economic downturn was used to
test whether managers overspent in payroll
expenses. Results showed that Nevada casino
managers were able to cut employees and
payroll expenses during the economic down-
turn of 2008–2013 even after accounting for
the decrease in firm size and the effects of
competition. That casinos were able to cut
almost 15% of their employees during the
downturn may be an indication that they were
heavily overstaffed during the decades before.
This gives support of expense preference
behavior by managers during periods on
sufficient revenue growth.
Implications of Findings
The findings of this study have both
academic and managerial implications.
An academic implication is that this study adds
to the previous literature on expense preference
behavior. This study is the first known study that
evaluates a sustained period of economic
downturn and management’s response to that
in relation to expense preference behavior, so a
new variable has been found that may indicate
expense preference behavior by managers. This
new variable can be used not only in other
hospitality segments but also to test expense
preference behavior in other unrelated indus-
tries. This is also the only known study on
expense preference behavior in the gaming
industry and only the fourth study in hospitality,
so it fills a gap in the literature. This study shows
that the gaming industry is not managed like the
banking industry or the other financial services
industries evaluated in previous research and, as
such, academia and researchers need to study it
separately.
The managerial implications show casino
managers and owners that theywere overstaffed
during revenuegrowthperiods. This is important
for many reasons. One reason is that more
money was being spent on payroll-related
expenses that could have been paid to owners
in the formof dividends or used for growth of the
properties, both of which would have increased
shareholders’ wealth. The additional cash
savings could have also been used to borrow
less if the company was borrowing to grow.
It couldalsobe savedandused in timeswhen the
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company has low or negative earnings before
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization
(EBITDA), as was the case for many casinos
during the sustainedperiodof fiscal years ending
June 30, 2009–2013. EBITDA is used synony-
mously for operating income in casino oper-
ations and is a performance measurement for
operating efficiency and effectiveness.
Anothermanagerial implication about being
overstaffed during high-growth economic times
concerns union contracts. Nevada casinos
typically sign 5- or 10-year union contracts
(Stutz, 2007). By signing these contracts when
the casinos were already overstaffed they were
committing to using a higher level of staffing
than is required, as was the case in 2007 when
many Nevada casinos signed new union
contracts. When revenue and business volumes
were increasing every year this may not have
been a concern because the casinos needed
the employees as business volumes continued
to rise. When business volumes suddenly
decreased and union contracts required casinos
to give employees a certain level of hours and
benefits, management did not have as much
flexibility to adjust. If they were staffed at the
right level to begin with, they would not have
had to cut as drastically and would not have had
to renegotiate contracts that had a higher level of
required employees.
This study can be used as a basis for theory
and a beginning model for individual casinos to
evaluate their own payroll related expenses.
Individual casinos could implement a time
series model with monthly data and more
detailed payroll expenses. Fixed and variable
positions or management and hourly employ-
ees could be evaluated separately to see
whether one category of employees is treated
differently. Casino management could evaluate
their property as compared to these results to
see whether they adjusted differently.
LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTED FUTURE
RESEARCH
As with any research, this study is not
without limitations. The main limitations were
with the data. First, individual property
information was not available. If properties
were staffing differently, the differences may be
hidden in the aggregate data. Another limi-
tation was that the data are annual. Monthly
data may show the effects of the predictor
variables better. A third limitation is that
number of employees was the only variable
available for staffing levels. A better indication
of employees may be full-time equivalents or
hours worked since these actually state the
amount of work done, not how may people are
employed. If these variables were available, the
number of employees model may be more in
line with the results from the other two models.
Future research could be a duplication of this
study with individual casino properties in
Nevada, which could alleviate these limitations.
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